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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
John Curtis May appeals from his conviction for possession of hydrocodone,
entered upon his conditional guilty plea. On appeal he challenges the district court’s
denial of his suppression motion.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The district court set forth the following findings of fact:
On June 16, 2015, Detective Matt Love (“Detective Love”) of the
Minidoka County Sheriff’s Office spoke with Probation and Parole Officer
Colin Widmier (“Officer Widmier”). Officer Widmier told Detective Love
that the Defendant was on parole, that he had absconded, and that there
was an agent’s warrant for his arrest. Detective Love did not receive a
written agent’s warrant for the Defendant’s arrest from any parole officer.
On June 17, 2015, Detective Love and other law enforcement
officers conducted a probation search of a residence in Minidoka County.
During the search, the officers found illegal drugs. As the search
continued, there was a knock on the front door. Detective Love opened
the door and saw the Defendant. Detective Love recognized the
Defendant from prior dealings.
Detective Love told the Defendant to turn around. The Defendant
turned around and put his hands behind his back. Detective Love took the
Defendant’s hands, but the Defendant pulled away and took off running.
Detective Love yelled at the Defendant to stop and chased after him.
However, the Defendant refused to stop. Detective Love eventually
placed the Defendant on the ground in the middle of the street.
While the Defendant was on the ground, he struggled with
Detective Love. Detective Love saw the Defendant trying to eat pills
obtained from his pocket. The pills were on the ground and coming out of
the Defendant’s mouth. After securing the Defendant in handcuffs, law
enforcement officers found a pill bottle on the Defendant’s person.
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(R., pp.68-69.)
The state charged May as a persistent violator with possession of hydrocodone
with the intent to deliver; possession of oxycodone with the intent to deliver; and
resisting and obstructing an officer. (R., pp.34-40.) May filed a motion to suppress the
evidence found on his person, arguing that his arrest was unlawful because it did not
comply with Idaho Code § 20-227, and so violated his constitutional rights. (R., p.30.)
After holding a hearing on the motion (See 10/19/2015 Tr.), the district court denied
May’s suppression motion (R., pp.68-71).
Reserving his right to appeal from the district court’s denial of his suppression
motion, May entered into a conditional plea agreement with the state pursuant to which
May pleaded guilty to possession of hydrocodone and the state dismissed the
remaining charges. (R., pp.77-80, 89-90, 100.) The district court entered judgment
against May and sentenced him to a unified term of five years with one and a half years
fixed. (R., pp.104-06.) May filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.108-09.)
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ISSUE
May states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. May’s motion to
suppress?
(Appellant’s brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has May failed to show error in the district court’s denial of his suppression
motion?
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ARGUMENT
May Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Denial Of His Suppression Motion
A.

Introduction
In his motion to suppress below, clarified at the suppression hearing, May argued

that his arrest violated Idaho Code § 20-227, and that the statutory violation in turn
violated his Fourth Amendment rights. (R., p.30; 10/19/2015 Tr., p.5, L.16 – p.6, L.18.)
The district court directly addressed this argument in its order denying May’s
suppression motion and concluded that the technical violation of Idaho Code § 20-227
did not violate May’s constitutional rights, and May was therefore not entitled to
suppression for the statutory violation.

(R., pp.68-71.)

On appeal, “May does not

contest the district court’s conclusion that he was arrested in violation of Idaho Code
§ 20-227, but that suppression is not the appropriate remedy for a violation of § 20-227.”
(Appellant’s brief, p.6.) Instead, “May … contends that the district court erred in failing
to suppress the evidence found on his person because he was seized and searched in
violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”

(Id.)

May’s

argument fails. First, he failed to preserve for appellate review a standalone claim that
his Fourth Amendment rights were violated.

Second, even considering the Fourth

Amendment claim on its merits, May has failed to show any violation of his
constitutional rights. The search and seizure were valid and the district court correctly
denied May’s suppression motion.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision

on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s
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findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the
application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841,
843, 103 P.3d 454, 456 (2004).

C.

May Failed To Preserve For Appellate Review His Standalone Claim That His
Fourth Amendment Rights Were Violated
In his appellant’s brief, May claims that “[a]t the suppression hearing, counsel for

Mr. May stated he sought to suppress the pills found on Mr. May’s person and made an
argument under § 20-227 and under the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.2.)

May’s contention is not supported by the

transcript of the hearing. Defense counsel argued that officers violated May’s Fourth
Amendment rights because they violated Idaho Code § 20-227 when they arrested him
and, he claimed, that statute was the only authority for seizing May. (10/19/2015 Tr.,
p.5, L.18 – p.6, L.18.) May’s claim that his constitutional rights were violated was
always tied to his claim that the statute was violated.
“Appellate court review is limited to the evidence, theories and arguments that
were presented below.” Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 714, 170 P.3d 375, 379
(2007); see also State v. Armstrong, 158 Idaho 364, 367, 347 P.3d 1025, 1028 (Ct. App.
2015). “Issues not raised below generally may not be considered for the first time on
appeal.” Armstrong, 158 Idaho at 367, 347 P.3d at 1028 (citing State v. Fodge, 121
Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992)). “For an objection to be preserved for
appellate review, either the specific ground for the objection must be clearly stated or
the basis of the objection must be apparent from the context.” Id. (citations omitted).
As recognized by the district court, May’s motion raised the narrow issue of whether
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suppression of evidence was the correct remedy for noncompliance with Idaho Code
§ 20-227. (R., p.69.) Having failed to raise an independent Fourth Amendment claim
before the district court, May has failed to preserve this issue for review.
Moreover, to preserve an issue for appellate review, the appellant must receive
an adverse ruling from the trial court on which to base an assignment of error. See
State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 442, 180 P.3d 476, 481 (2008) (“This Court will not
review a trial court’s alleged error on appeal unless the record discloses an adverse
ruling which forms the basis for the assignment of error.”) (internal quotations omitted).
Even had May presented a standalone Fourth Amendment claim, he certainly did not
receive a ruling on that issue—which May does not contest; in fact, May acknowledges
that “the district court did not make any findings or conclusions regarding reasonable
suspicion or Mr. May’s apparent Fourth Amendment waiver.” (Appellant’s brief, p.8.)
Because May failed to present a standalone Fourth Amendment claim below,
instead presenting the narrow issue of whether a statutory noncompliant arrest required
suppression of evidence, appellate review is limited to that argument and May has failed
to show any error in the district court’s resolving of that narrow issue. Even had May
raised a standalone Fourth Amendment claim, as May points out on appeal, the district
court never addressed such a claim. Either way, this issue is unpreserved and should
not be addressed on appeal.

D.

On The Merits, May’s Fourth Amendment Rights Were Not Violated
Even if May had preserved his standalone claim that his Fourth Amendment

rights were somehow violated by his arrest and subsequent search, that claim would fail
on its merits. First, May voluntarily waived his Fourth Amendment rights as an express

6

condition of his probation; therefore, May had no Fourth Amendment rights that could
be violated by his arrest and subsequent search. Second, even ignoring May’s waiver,
his search did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it was conducted incident to a
lawful arrest.

1.

May’s Voluntary Waiver Of His Fourth Amendment Right To Be Free From
Warrantless Searches Validates The Warrantless Search

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
Warrantless searches are generally considered unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, “subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.” Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).

One exception to the warrant requirement is a search done

pursuant to consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (citations
omitted); State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796, 69 P.3d 1052, 1057 (2003). Freely and
voluntarily given consent validates a search. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 222 (citations
omitted). When a probationer or parolee, as an express term of his release, has waived
his right to be free from a warrantless search, such warrantless searches are valid.
State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 209, 207 P.3d 182, 185 (2009) (citing State v. Gawron,
112 Idaho 841, 843, 736 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1987)).
At the suppression hearing May’s parole officer testified that, as an express
condition of his parole, May waived his Fourth Amendment rights. (10/19/2015 Tr.,
p.26, L.15 – p.27, L.12.) Those Fourth Amendment waivers were presented in court
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and copies, made by the court during the hearing (id., p.27, Ls.16-23), were entered into
evidence (id., p.35, L.18 – p.36, L.7; see also State’s Exs. 1 and 2).

The waiver

regarding searches stated:
The parolee shall consent to the search of his/her person, residence,
vehicle, personal property, and other real property or structures owned or
leased by the parolee or for which the parolee is the controlling authority
conducted by any agent of the Idaho Dept of Correction or other law
enforcement officer. The parolee waives his/her Fourth Amendment
Rights concerning searches.
(See State’s Exs. 1 and 2.) Because May consented to a “search of his … person … by
any … law enforcement officer” and waived his Fourth Amendment right to be free from
warrantless searches, the warrantless search in this case, which was conducted by a
law enforcement officer, was valid.

2.

May’s Warrantless Search Was Valid Because It Was Incident To His
Lawful Arrest

Even if there had been no Fourth Amendment waiver present in this case—which
there was—May’s search would still be valid because it was incident to a lawful arrest.
A search incident to lawful arrest is another exception to the warrant requirement.
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).

Warrantless arrests based on

probable cause are lawful under the Fourth Amendment. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S.
164, 171 (2008); see also Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003); I.C. § 19-603.
Probable cause is “the possession of information that would lead a person of ordinary
care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong presumption that such
person is guilty.” State v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 136, 922 P.2d 1059, 1062 (1996)
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(citation omitted). In determining whether the State has met the standard of probable
cause, the Court considers the totality of the circumstances. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371.
May’s arrest was valid on at least three grounds:

First, Detective Love had

probable cause that May had absconded parole. Second, in the presence of Detective
Love, May committed the crime of resisting and obstructing an officer.

Third, the

detective discovered, in plain view, pills on May’s person.
In this case, Parole Officer Widmier informed Detective Love that May had
absconded parole and there was an agent’s warrant out for his arrest. (R., pp.68-69;
10/19/2015 Tr., p.10, L.6 – p.11, L.5.) Idaho Code § 20-227 authorizes any parole
officer to arrest a parolee without a warrant, and to deputize other officers to arrest the
parolee, when that parolee violates his parole. Deputation requires a written statement
(agent’s warrant), I.C. § 20-227(1), which did not occur in this case. But as the district
court concluded, and May concedes on appeal, such statutory noncompliance does not
violate the Constitution. (R., pp.69-71; Appellant’s brief, p.6.) Because Detective Love
had probable cause to arrest May, due to his violating parole by absconding, the arrest
was constitutionally valid and the search incident to that arrest was lawful. See State v.
Green, 158 Idaho 884, 354 P.3d 446 (2015).
Even if Detective Love could not lawfully arrest May on the parole violation, he
could still lawfully arrest May for resisting and obstructing the officer. Idaho Code § 18705 criminalizes the act of willfully resisting, delaying, or obstructing an officer in his
duties. When Detective Love attempted to detain May, May broke away from the officer
and fled. (R., p.69; 10/19/2015 Tr., p.12, Ls.11-25.) By so doing, May committed the
crime of resisting and obstructing the officer in fulfilling his duties.
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Detective Love’s detention of May was lawful on two bases: First, if the officer
could not lawfully arrest May on the parole violation, then he could at least detain him
on reasonable suspicion of the violation. Investigative detentions are permissible on
reasonable suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged
in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); United States v. Cortez, 449
U.S. 411, 417 (1981). Reasonable suspicion may be supplied by an informant’s tip or a
citizen’s report of suspected criminal activity. State v. Larson, 135 Idaho 99, 101, 15
P.3d 334, 336 (Ct. App. 2000). “Whether information from such a source is sufficient to
create reasonable suspicion depends upon the content and reliability of the information
presented by the source, including whether the informant reveals her identity and the
basis of her knowledge.” Id. (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990); Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146–47 (1972)).
Officer Widmier’s informing Detective Love that May had absconded from parole,
though not statutorily sufficient to deputize the detective under Idaho Code § 20-227,
still constituted a tip from an identifiable and reliable source. Detective Love therefore
had sufficient reasonable suspicion to detain May.
Second, officers were conducting a probation search of the residence when May
arrived at the residence, and so could detain him for being on the premises during the
search. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981) (when law enforcement
officers are executing a search warrant on a premises, they may briefly detain
occupants of the premises); State v. Pierce, 137 Idaho 296, 299-300, 47 P.3d 1266,
1270-71 (Ct. App. 2002) (persons who arrive at the premises during a search may be
detained for the time necessary to determine identity and any connection to the
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premises). Though Idaho appellate courts have specifically not decided whether the
Summers rule should be extended to individuals found on the premises of a lawful
probation search, see State v. Reynolds, 143 Idaho 911, 916, 155 P.3d 712, 717 (Ct.
App. 2007), courts that have addressed the issue have extended the rule, see, e.g.,
People v. Matelski, 82 Cal. App. 4th 837, 851-52, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 543, 552-53 (2000).
At least in the case of parolees, this Court should extend the Summers rule to
allow police to detain parolees found on the premises during a lawful probation search.
“[P]arolees have severely diminished privacy expectations by virtue of their status
alone.” Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 852 (2006). Intrusions by government
authorities which may otherwise be invalid are rendered reasonable by parolees’ and
probationers’ reduced expectation of privacy. State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207
P.3d 182 (2009). At a minimum, because of May’s status as a parolee, officers were
justified in detaining him to determine his connection to the premises.
Because officers could lawfully detain May, either on the basis of the tip from
Officer Widmier or because May arrived during the lawful probation search of the
residence, May violated the law when he willfully resisted, delayed, and obstructed
Detective Love in his attempt to detain May. Detective Love had probable cause to
arrest May, and the search incident to that arrest was lawful.
Finally, even if Detective Love had not received information from Officer Widmier,
and even if his attempt to detain May was not within the scope permitted by Summers
and its progeny, Detective Love still had reasonable suspicion to detain May because of
his flight from law enforcement. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000)
(“Headlong flight—wherever it occurs—is the consummate act of evasion:
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It is not

necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.”). Upon
detaining May, Detective Love observed May attempting to consume pills. (R., p.69;
10/19/2015 Tr., p.13, Ls.1-14.) Seeing May possess the contraband gave the officer
sufficient probable cause to lawfully arrest him. The search incident to that lawful arrest
was therefore valid.
May’s arrest was lawful, whether because officers knew that he was an
absconded parolee; or because he resisted and obstructed officers when they lawfully
attempted to detain him; or because officers viewed, in plain sight, pills on his person.
Because his arrest was lawful, the search incident to that arrest was valid under the
Fourth Amendment. May’s argument that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated is
without merit. The district court correctly denied his motion to suppress. The district
court should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order
denying May’s suppression motion.
DATED this 2nd day of September, 2016.

/s/ Russell J. Spencer___________________
RUSSELL J. SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General
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copy to:
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
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RUSSELL J. SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General
RJS/dd
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